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Introduction
The international intervention in Afghanistan was a reaction to the terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2009. At the time, the
intervention could count on broad political support and the understanding of a
large share of public opinion, also because of the UN mandate. Very quickly,
remarkable results were obtained: ousting the Taliban from power, closing the
terrorist training camps, undermining al-Qaeda as an organization and sup-
pressing insurgent activities in large parts of Afghan territory. After a while a
security situation was achieved which allowed for reconstruction in regions
which had known nothing but war for thirty years. Significant political, eco-
nomic and social progress was achieved in a relatively short term.
Seven years later the optimist discourse has lost all credibility. The security situ-
ation is constantly degrading, not just in Afghanistan, but far into Pakistan as
well, while tensions are mounting in the broad region. It has become clear to
everyone that now, more than ever, a new approach, a different strategy is
needed – muddling through is not an option. Nor is a hasty retreat: too many
parameters have changed for the negative to allow that.
Yet, defeatism, as it emerged a few years ago with regard to Iraq, is not now
called for either. Paradoxically the current situation, bad though it may be, also
contains the roots of a renewed and improved approach, thanks to a number of
external developments. First of all the new US administration has opted for a
new foreign policy, for which Afghanistan, and Pakistan and India, are clear
priorities, while it also envisages a new policy vis-à-vis Iran. The situation in
Iraq has seen major developments. In Afghanistan itself elections are planned
later this year. The changed political and economic conditions in Pakistan lead
to a change in policy towards Afghanistan and India alike. The interests of the
three countries, relations between which historically have been marked by high
tensions, are now converging. These developments have engendered more atten-
tion for the crisis by the EU, where the conviction is growing that “flanking
measures” alone are no longer sufficient. The global economic and financial
crisis has necessitated a reinforced dialogue between all global actors, including
China. Thus, a new approach is not just vital – it is achievable.
There is no lack of publications about Afghanistan, addressing such issues as the
fragmented efforts of the international community, the shortage of military
means, the unintentional but very negative side effects of military operations,
the inefficiency of the donor community and of NGOs, the relative weakness of
the Karzai government, wide-spread corruption and drug trade, the lack ofEND-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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involvement of Afghan local authorities and traditional and religious elites,
spill-over towards Pakistan, the absence of economic perspective in the region…
The question is whether this bottom-up approach, addressing the many dimen-
sions of indeed very complicated crisis management, is sufficient to engender
change in the current situation and eventually come to a successful solution.
That immediately leads to another question: what is success? Which are the
strategic objectives? Is there consensus about them in the international commu-
nity, in consultation with Afghanistan? What is the position of Pakistan and
India? A limited number of official publications do address these more strategic-
level issues. Such analysis always starts from a specific national perspective,
which has its own logic and which emphasises the national contribution, while
other actors are expected to fill the perceived gaps. All too often confusion is
created – willingly or unwillingly – between strategic objectives and the means
required to achieve them, which produces confusion at the political level and
generates false hope among the local population. This probably explains why a
sincere assessment of the indeed ambiguous, but at the same time ambitious
objectives versus the required means is rarely if ever made.
This is not without consequences on the ground. An international community
which may rejoice in the active contribution of a panoply of actors with a wide
range of instruments, is unable to achieve unity of effort. The perceived capabil-
ity gaps are not being filled, while the lack of efficiency and efficacy of existing
means leads to a demand for “more”. In the meantime the security situation is
degrading and the effect of some of the earlier efforts destroyed. Increasing
political tension between the international community and the Afghan authori-
ties is the result, while because of spill-over effects Pakistan and India are
becoming involved and, finally, tensions within the international community are
rising as well, even between countries that jointly participate in operations or
projects.
This vicious circle must be broken. This Egmont Paper does not have the ambi-
tion to propose a fully-fledged strategy, nor to elaborate concrete actions, but
aims to return to the core of crisis management in Afghanistan and stimulate a
broad debate about a grand strategy. In a first part, it will analyze which were
the strategic objectives at the start of the intervention and which steps have
subsequently been taken by the international community that led to the situa-
tion we know today. In a second part, some recent ideas about key objectives
and desired strategic outcomes will be assessed, to conclude finally with a
number of recommendations to the international community, the UN, NATO,
the EU, and their Member States, including Belgium.END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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Like other Egmont Papers in this series, this publication is the product of an
informal group of experts from academic, diplomatic and military circles,
including, among others, Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, Egmont, Alex Bracke, Ir. MA,
Prof. Dr. Rik Coolsaet, Ghent University, Alexander Mattelaer, VUB, Jacques
Rosiers, EAAB, Prof. Dr. Tanguy Struye, UCL, Ambassador Baron (Franciskus)
van Daele, and Col. Patrick Wouters. My sincere gratitude to all members of the
working group for their contribution; I of course assume responsibility for the
text.
Brigadier-General (R) Jo COELMONT1
1. Brig-Gen (R) Jo Coelmont is a Senior Associate Fellow at Egmont – Royal Institute for International
Relations. From 2002 to 2007 he served as Belgium’s Permanent Representative on the EU Military Com-
mittee.7
The Strategic Context
Objectives and Means
Rarely are the real strategic motivations of a politico-military intervention
clearly formulated. This is certainly the case when we are confronted with a
complex political situation and hence equally complex decision-making. When
furthermore numerous countries, international organizations and NGOs are
involved and public opinion starts asking critical questions, it comes as no sur-
prise that the strategic debate is blurred.
In order to bring some clarity, a distinction must be made between, on the one
hand, the objectives to be achieved and, on the other hand, the means which that
requires. The “end-state” of just about all peacekeeping operations currently
undertaken by the UN, NATO or the EU refers to a “Safe and Secure Environ-
ment” (SASE). Starting point is that the peacekeeping force creates “military
security”. Once achieved, this amounts at most to “precarious security” though,
lasting only as long as the force remains present. In parallel therefore a legiti-
mate government, with its own armed forces, police, customs and justice system
must take over these tasks. Furthermore, a durable SASE can only be achieved
if there is economic and social perspective. In other words, security, governance
and socio-economic development are all conditions for successful crisis manage-
ment, but not necessarily objectives in their own right. The fact that in many
countries around the globe there is no SASE at all without an international inter-
vention ever being considered, clearly proves that the “raison d’état” motivating
military operations lies elsewhere.
In the case of Afghanistan it has been unclear from the beginning whether for
the US state-building and reconstruction was a key objective in itself, or merely
a condition to achieve success in its Global War on Terror.
Dynamics within Crisis Management
Each conflict has its own dynamics, and of course the outside world evolves as
well. It is only normal therefore that in long-term crisis management, like in
Afghanistan, strategic objectives and especially the strategic approach evolve
over time.
For the US “9/11” could not but be met with swift and forceful reaction. The
first concrete actions were aimed at al-Qaeda and its training camps in Afghan-END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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istan. Intense but brief contacts with the Taliban government led to the conclu-
sion that with this regime quick results against al-Qaeda were impossible.
It should not come as a surprise that years later more nuanced strategies
towards the Taliban are being developed.
An indirect consequence of the military intervention was the upsetting of the
fragile and very Machiavellian balance of power that existed on both sides of
the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a result of the fighting in
Afghanistan various insurgent groups have crossed the porous Durand Line that
divides the Pashtun community over these two countries. These movements
have undercut the long-standing policies of both Kabul and Islamabad towards
their respective Pashtun populations and have influenced the triangular rela-
tions between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Combined with a number of
internal political and economic developments, the result has been that the cen-
tral government in Islamabad has been much weakened in its position vis-à-vis
the “tribal areas”. De facto, a sanctuary for insurgents of all kinds has come into
existence on the territory of Pakistan, which entails a threat to stability in the
region as a whole.
“To deny the Taliban and al-Qaeda the environment in which to operate” thus
has a very different meaning now than it had in 2001. Pakistan is now inextri-
cably involved in the conflict and becomes more and more central to its solution.
Initially, the Bush administration did not favour a multilateral approach, at least
to the military intervention. It was feared that making use of NATO would
imply long debates about the objectives of military operations and differences
about their tactical implementation, as had been the case during the Kosovo air
campaign.
The difficulties which the US and its coalition partners were subsequently met
with on the ground in Afghanistan and the need for additional forces, did lead
to NATO becoming increasingly involved after all, as well as a variety of coun-
tries working with NATO in Afghanistan.
The intervention in Iraq in 2003 meant a shift of the political and military centre
of attention. Afghanistan stopped being a priority in Washington just as it
became clear that additional military, civilian and financial means were
required. A new situation has now emerged in Iraq, rendering irrelevant the
question whether initially the US in Afghanistan was seeking to establish a base
for power projection in the region.END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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If the positive prospects for a withdrawal of forces from Iraq are realized, that
will undoubtedly again have a strategic impact on crisis management in Afghan-
istan, Pakistan and the whole of the region.11
The Actions Undertaken by the International 
Community
The policy of the international community has undergone some remarkable evo-
lutions, as an analysis of the major conferences of the international community
and of the involvement of NATO and the EU demonstrates.
The Bonn Agreement (5 December 2001)
In Bonn, the participants in the UN talks on Afghanistan define quite precise
objectives and modalities and a strict time frame for the setting up of transit
structures and the organization of elections in order to arrive at a new govern-
ment and constitution. It is striking that a very centralized system is envisaged,
with all decisions, including the appointment of provincial governors, to be
taken in Kabul and the UN “advising” and offering its “good offices”. The Secu-
rity Council is called upon to deploy an International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) that will render assistance in order to create security in Kabul and its
surroundings.
The international community clearly opts for a two-track policy. The military
dimension will be taken care of by the international community and a UN-man-
dated force is deployed alongside the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF). As to the civilian dimension, both the definition and implementation of
a strategy for reconstruction are left to the Afghan government, with an inter-
national donor conference providing the necessary finance.
The Tokyo Conference (21-22 January 2002)
The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan sig-
nals that henceforth donor assistance depends on the positive cooperation of the
Afghan authorities to achieve the Bonn objectives. A number of key priority
areas for reconstruction are defined. It is stipulated that “the UN should con-
tinue to play a pivotal role”. The World Bank will set up a single trust fund,
while the allocation of the means remains the authority of donors and the
Afghan government. In order to achieve “strategic coherence and coordination”
among the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), donors and NGOs, an Implemen-
tation Group, chaired by the AIA, will meet regularly in Kabul.END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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In Tokyo the international community clearly seeks a bigger influence on policy,
but its impact on implementation remains very limited.
The London Conference (31 January – 1 February 2006)
As the hoped for progress on the ground does not materialize, the international
community takes new steps. The London Conference, better known as the
Afghanistan Compact, envisages a renewed and more global approach. Three
pillars of activity are identified, with benchmarks and timelines for the next five
years: security; governance, the rule of law, and human rights; and economic
and social development. It is clearly stated that “the success of the Compact
relies on an effective coordination and monitoring mechanism”. A “central and
impartial coordination role” is accorded to the UN, be it in partnership with the
Afghan government, which is pointed to the importance of “ownership of the
Afghan people”, public transparency and accountability, and the fight against
corruption. In return for financial support, the Afghan government is requested
“to provide a prioritised and detailed Afghanistan National Development Strat-
egy (ANDS) with indicators for monitoring results”. A Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board with representatives of the international community is estab-
lished, co-chaired by a senior Afghan government official and the Special Rep-
resentative of the UN Secretary-General. Surprisingly though the Compact
explicitly states that “the Board will have a small secretariat staffed by the
Afghan government and the United Nations”, with “periodic meetings” – as if
it concerns a small matter for which periodic stock-taking and possibly advising
changes is sufficient.
Nonetheless the international community clearly wants a bigger grip on the
implementation of the civilian dimension of crisis management. The will to cre-
ate a global implementation mechanism is there, but whether this will be a pow-
erful instrument remains unclear. The task is confided to the UN which – as
often – is accorded very modest means, which are not in relation to the enor-
mous investment of the international community in Afghanistan.
The Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
(I-ANDS – 2006)
The I-ANDS process was launched in early 2005 and in 2006 produced a doc-
ument which points out the rather sombre situation of the country. The central
government is given the responsibility for elaborating solutions in all policyEND-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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areas. Essentially a very descriptive document, I-ANDS formulates numerous
intentions, but remains very vague on how to achieve concrete results. 2010 is
usually mentioned as deadline, a date simply copied from previous documents.
The objectives in the field of security are hardly realistic. Budgetary planning is
all but absent, although it is stated that “over 90% of all national development
resources [are] currently provided by international cooperation partners”.2 In
order to enhance aid effectiveness, donors are called upon to align their pro-
grammes with I-ANDS and “to fund them within the framework of the national
core budget”.3
Thus for the Afghan government the fragmented international effort should be
met with a tight central, “presidential” approach from Kabul. The achievability
of the implementation, finance and timeline of this all too vague administrative
approach must be severely doubted.
The Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS – 2008)
The final ANDS, covering the period 2008-2013, is a much heavier document
than the interim version, but most additions are either of a theoretical or an
administrative nature. Surprisingly, whereas I-ANDS started from a worrying
situation, the final document sets out to list a long series of achievements since
2001. Even more than before, the central government is seen as the answer to
all problems. The concrete and detailed objectives that are formulated contrast
sharply with the ever degrading situation on the ground. Again it is proposed
that the donor community makes its means directly available to the government,
i.e. the President.
The influence of the upcoming elections on this document is evident. No new
approaches to find solutions are proposed. A well-presented, all-encompassing
programme overlooks nobody in Afghanistan, but is neither affordable nor
achievable. It is no surprise therefore that tensions result between the interna-
tional community and the Karzai government. In order to achieve unity of
effort, the Karzai government wants donors to directly contribute to the govern-
ment budget. Disappointed with the limited results of the government and its
lack of influence on the ground, the international community starts looking for
2. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy.
Summary Report. An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduc-
tion. Kabul, 2006, p. 62.
3. Ibid., p. 63.END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
14
ways of becoming active on the ground itself and of de-centralizing policy, two
novel options for the civilian dimension of crisis management.
NATO
Although on 12 September 2001 NATO Secretary-General George Robertson,
in consultation with the European Allies, declared the willingness of the Alliance
to invoke Article 5, NATO initially was not involved in the military operations.
In October 2001, the US launched a military campaign, OEF, in conjunction
with the Afghan Northern Alliance. Combining US air power with Northern
Alliance-provided ground forces, this campaign led to the fall of the Taliban
regime in December 2001. As a US-led counter-terrorism mission, OEF contin-
ues to operate, primarily in the Eastern provinces.
Following the first phase of this campaign and subsequent to the Bonn Agree-
ment, ISAF was launched under UNSC 1386 of 20 December 2001, to assist in
securing Kabul. The UK was mandated to lead the deployment. ISAF did not
become a NATO-led operation until 11 August 2003, at the explicit request of
the UN, as it became increasingly difficult for the UN to find countries willing
to volunteer to lead the force. Thereafter, slowly but steadily, driven by events,
ISAF’s area of operation began to extend, into the Northern and Western prov-
inces in June 2004, into the Southern and Eastern provinces in July and October
2006, so that at present it covers the whole of the country. OEF and ISAF remain
separate operations, but in 2006 the missions were closely coordinated, as ele-
ments of their command structures were merged and air support for both was
provided by a single US Coalition Combined Air Control Centre.
The mission and the desired end-state are clear: “ISAF is in Afghanistan to assist
the government of Afghanistan in ensuring a safe and secure environment that
will be conducive to establishing democratic structures, to facilitate the recon-
struction of the country and to assist in expanding the influence of the central
government”.4 The desired end-state is defined as “a self-sustaining, moderate
and democratic Afghan government, in line with the relevant UNSCRs, able to
exercise its authority and to operate throughout Afghanistan, without the need
for ISAF to help provide security”.5
4. House of Commons Defence Committee, UK operations in Afghanistan. Thirteenth Report of Session
2006-07. London, 2007, p.12.
5. NATO, OPLAN 10302, de-classified version, 8 April 2004.END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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The contribution of NATO and its members is not limited to ISAF. Since 2003
the Alliance has a Senior Civil Representative who maintains diplomatic and
political relations with the Afghan government and other key actors. NATO
also has concluded an agreement about Security Sector Reform (SSR), focussing
on assisting the Afghan National Army (ANA), notably through Operational
Liaison and Mentor Teams (OLMTs). It also seeks to increase its support to the
Afghan National Police (ANP). The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
represent the NATO nations’ effort in civil-military issues; individual nations
have lead responsibility for the activities within their PRTs.
In its quest for a “comprehensive approach”, NATO has elaborated a Compre-
hensive Strategic Political Military Plan, approved at the Bucharest Summit (2-
4 April 2008). It stresses “a firm and shared commitment among the NATO
countries, support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility, a compre-
hensive approach by the international community, and increased cooperation
with Afghanistan’s neighbours as part of a broader regional strategy”. Some
fifteen “desired strategic outcomes” have been identified, which will be regu-
larly assessed within the Alliance. So far the conclusions of these assessments
have been sombre: “enhancement is required” for just about every objective. For
adapting its own actions, NATO has the structures, means and procedures to
find solutions in a relatively short term. The fundamental problems are else-
where and require action at another level: NATO nations are requested to pro-
vide additional means (and do away with national caveats); they are also called
upon to undertake specific initiatives vis-à-vis the Afghan authorities or on spe-
cific international forums. Analyzing these “desired strategic outcomes” shows
that NATO never has the final responsibility for these objectives.
NATO thus finds itself in an exceptional situation. Not being involved in the
initial military operations, it now leads an important part of the crisis manage-
ment effort, ISAF, which has come to cover the whole of Afghan territory. Its
task is to assist in establishing a SASE, but the supporting political and civilian
efforts – in se not a NATO responsibility – to move from a “precarious” to a
“durable” SASE never materialized. The additional tasks which NATO
assumed in terms of SSR and civil-military assistance were insufficient to turn
the tide. A lack of progress by the international community and the Afghan
authorities towards reconstruction and the failure to remove the ideological
foundations of the insurgency all contributed to the degrading of security, which
in the end had to be realized with rather limited military means. NATO’s mis-
sion thus is part and parcel of the broader efforts of the international commu-
nity, in which political solutions, including for the socio-economic dimensions,
are key. Even in the military dimension NATO is not the only actor on the
ground and can thus not be held responsible for the international effort as aEND-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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whole. NATO’s mission to assist in ensuring a SASE is a derivative of the global
strategic objectives. But clarity at the strategic level will allow NATO nations
and allies to review their contributions and to align NATO efforts within a
renewed overall approach of the international community.
The EU and its Member States
As the European foreign, security and defence policy is marked both by integra-
tion and intergovernmentalism, both the EU and the Member States must
always be referred to. In 2001 Europe immediately voiced its solidarity with the
US and actively contributed to decision-making on Afghanistan in the UNSC
and to organizing various conferences of the international community. But
European priorities at the time lay elsewhere than in Central Asia – the central
priority was the political and economic development of Europe as it emerged
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, including the follow-up to the conflicts on the
Balkans, relations with Russia, and the widening and deepening of the Union
itself. In the military field, the EU had just created its European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP), based on the lessons drawn from Europe’s military
absence at the start of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. But although the EU
has now launched several military operations, the means of ESDP remain lim-
ited, notably with regard to the command and control of complex operations.
When operations in Afghanistan started, the Member States were not yet ready
to express a strategic vision; the European Security Strategy was not adopted
until 2003. The military dimension of crisis management in Afghanistan is only
discussed sideways in the EU; the actual debate takes place in NATO.
In the civilian dimension, notably in the field of police and justice, the EU is
facing a double challenge. On the one hand civilian ESDP is a relatively new
instrument which at current can only call upon limited means. On the other
hand, since 2003 the EU has launched over a dozen civilian operations, on the
Balkans, in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in Congo, Iraq and the Middle East,
and was recently called upon to take over from the UN a – to EU standards –
large mission in Kosovo. Holding the final responsibility for all these operations,
the EU assessed the availability of means for Afghanistan only in a secondary
step, hence the difficulties encountered by operation EUPOL Afghanistan.
Launched in 2007 for a duration of three years, building upon an earlier Ger-
man initiative, it includes police trainers and experts in the field of justice from
Member States and third countries such as Canada, Norway and Croatia.
Achieving the envisaged – and in view of the tasks rather modest – strength of
400 proved impossible. Eventually only about 200 were deployed, demonstrat-
ing once again the many obstacles met by civilian operations. Whereas for theEND-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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military foreign deployments are a core task, that is not the case for police and
justice. Furthermore, in many countries the authority to select the necessary per-
sonnel rests not with the federal but the regional level. Each mission consists of
volunteers and requires ad hoc organization of the logistic support and com-
mand & control structure. Most of those deployed for EUPOL were policy advi-
sors which could not be expected to be able to cope with the many police train-
ing tasks to be undertaken in the field. This did not remain without conse-
quences: the envisaged EU operation was silently taken over by a large-scale US
initiative.
Where the Commission has supranational authority, various projects have been
set up in Afghanistan, including in the field of development and economic sup-
port. The EU can mobilize important financial means, but does not always pos-
sess adequate staff and structures to ensure efficient implementation on the
ground. Both the Commission and the Secretariat-General of the Council, and
High Representative Javier Solana, are in close contact with NATO about
Afghanistan.
The EU and its Member States do show solidarity but – with a few exceptions,
such as the UK – remain absent from the strategic debate. Based on their own
logic and priorities an upper and lower limit is set for the contribution of mili-
tary, civilian and financial means. The actual contributions differ widely
between countries, but are all based on the same premise of doing “just enough”
to maintain solidarity with the US. Europe’s absence in the strategic debate
impedes the development of a strategic vision on the deployment of its own
assets. In this context, a comprehensive approach is all but impossible.19
The Key Objective, the Desired End-State, and 
the Ways to Achieve them
As the intervention of the international community enters its eighth year, we are
more and more told that “it will last a long time”, at least in Western under-
standing, “longer than the United States’ longest war to date, the 14-year con-
flict (1961-1975) in Vietnam”.6 That international community now has
deployed in Afghanistan about “one twenty-fifth of the troops and one fiftieth
of the aid per head in Bosnia”.7 But even if the international community in a
renewed effort finds the political strength to stay present for ten to fifteen years
and does manage this time round to align means and objectives, even then after
its “exit” an Afghanistan will emerge that like every society will have to found
its balance on the permanent pillars of culture, religion, history and geography.
Evidently the regional political and economic context will also be of prime
importance. These truths are obvious to the Afghan government and the Afghan
people alike, and from them emerge the contours of possible, evidently limited
objectives.
The marked degradation of the security situation has indeed given rise to less
ambitious objectives, feasible within the “foreseeable” future. US Defence Sec-
retary Robert Gates has stated this clearly: “My own personal view is that our
primary goal is to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorists
and extremists to attack the United States and our allies, and whatever else we
need to do flows from that objective”, adding that the strategy should now be
to define “more concrete goals that can be achieved realistically within three to
five years in terms of re-establishing control in certain areas, providing security
for the population, going after al-Qaeda, preventing the re-establishment of ter-
rorism, better performance in terms of delivery of services to the people – some
very concrete things”. Or even more clearly: “Afghanistan is the fourth- or fifth-
poorest country in the world, and if we set ourselves the objective of creating
some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose”.8 In addition, he
stated that there is “no purely military solution” for Afghanistan and that a
redefined strategy would require allies to “provide more civilian support”. In
particular, partners should assume more responsibility for building “civil soci-
ety”, a task hitherto of the American forces.9 In the same vein, a classified report
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Barack Obama dated February 2009
“reflects growing worries that the US military was taking on more than it could
6. Richard Holbrooke, “The Next President”. In: Foreign Affairs, Sept-Oct 2008.
7. “Paddy Ashdown: Just the Man to Bang Heads together in Kabul”. In: The Times, 2 February 2009.
8. “Aides Say Obama to Concentrate on Military Efforts in Afghanistan”. In: International Herald Trib-
une, 28 January 2009.
9. “Afghanistan is Greatest Challenge”. In: The Financial Times, 28 January 2009.END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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handle in Afghanistan by pursuing the Bush administration’s broad goal of nur-
turing a thriving democratic government”, and calls instead for “a more nar-
rowly focussed effort to root out militant strongholds along the Pakistani border
and inside the neighbouring country”, notably by putting more emphasis on
training Pakistani forces and the ANA/ANP.10
Consequently, President Obama has charted a fundamentally different course
for his foreign and security policy in general and with regard to Afghanistan in
particular. Obama has stressed that “the language we use matters”, but clearly
more than words have changed: “The war on terror is over. […] What’s left is
what matters: defeating terrorist organizations. That’s not a war. It’s a strategic
challenge”. Whereas Bush used to distinguish between terrorists and moderate
Muslims, Obama, more importantly, distinguishes between those bent on the
violent destruction of America and those who merely disagree with the US. The
undertone is self-critical, rather than offensive, and shows a great willingness to
listen. Obama has reached out to the Muslim community as a whole and to all
countries in the region, including Iran.11
All of this makes clear that we have arrived at a turning-point, at which from
the US-side steps have already been taken to clearly define the key objective of
the intervention in Afghanistan: to prevent Afghan territory from being used as
a base for international terrorism, with an emphasis on the border region with
Pakistan. This objective will determine everything else.
Clear indications have already been provided by the US of how this less ambi-
tious objective can best be achieved. While there is no purely military solution,
the existing forces must be substantially reinforced, for the most part by addi-
tional US troops. In the civilian dimension, considered vital, additional efforts
are expected from allies, notably the EU and its Member States. A number of
tasks hitherto undertaken by (American) military forces need to be transferred.
Civilian and military assistance to ANA, ANP and the justice system is very
important, as is improving Afghan governance, with a renewed emphasis on the
involvement of local government and the broader population, on the condition
that this does not hamper the key objective of combating international terror-
ism. As the new term “AfPak” shows, the US now approaches the situation in
both countries as one, while combating the insurgency in Pakistan is first of all
considered a responsibility of the national government. With regard to the
regional dimension a concrete plan of action involving all key actors, including
Iran, is being envisaged.
10. “Pentagon Study: US Should Pare Afghanistan Goals”. In: Associated Press, 3 February 2009.
11. “After the War on Terror”. In: International Herald Tribune, 29 January 2009.END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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An exit strategy is thus being developed which aims at substantial progress
within five years and definite results within a decade, not excluding a minimal
permanent presence afterwards. “Afghanisation” is central, next to a broad
regional and political approach.
However, on one crucial element of strategy, there is as yet no consensus. In
which degree will foreign troops take part in counter-insurgency (COIN), in
addition to counter-terrorism (CT) operations? The strategic choice which the
international community must make depends on the answer to the essential
question whether defeating the Taliban (COIN) is still a vital prerequisite for
preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base for international terrorism.
In function of the answer, two end-states are possible: (1) a complete defeat of
the Taliban to allow for a stable regime that does not provide a safe haven to
terrorist organizations; or (2) a situation of “sustainable stability” essentially
aimed at preventing new safe havens for the so-called children or cousins of al-
Qaeda.12
The first end-state implies a counter-insurgency strategy aimed at a military
defeat of the Taliban. Taking into account current estimates of 20 troops per
1,000 inhabitants required for successful COIN, just for the South and the Paki-
stani border region this would demand a force of 274,000 troops. Tribal militias
would have to be created against the Taliban and a divide and rule policy
adopted, implying negotiations with certain elements of the Taliban. A regional
approach integrating Pakistan and Iran seems highly unlikely in this scenario.
The second end-state requires a political process allowing for the withdrawal of
foreign troops, while maintaining pressure on the remaining terrorist networks.
This scenario demands even more negotiations with parts of the Taliban, leading
to the question which “price” is acceptable to gain their cooperation – can one
accept the introduction of their orthodox and ultra-conservative programme in
parts of Afghanistan? On the other hand, this scenario could allow for a
regional approach in collaboration with Pakistan and Iran.
It is likely then that an approach holding the middle ground between these two
options will be adopted. In a first phase, the momentum of the insurgency
would be halted and the insurgency then reduced to an “acceptable” level by
temporary reinforcements of foreign troops. Simultaneously, and probably for
some time, very targeted counter-terrorism actions will be undertaken by part of
12. Paul Pillar, “Jihadi Terrorism: A Global Assessment of the Threat in the post-al-Qaeda Era”. In: Rik
Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008,
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the international forces (OEF). In the meantime, ANA and ANP would be
equipped and trained to gradually take over more tasks, for them in the end,
after a few years, to be able to deal autonomously with the insurgency. In this
final phase, the tasks of the international forces are similar to those of the Amer-
ican troops remaining at present in Iraq.23
A Final Observation
Crisis Management Operations
In order to increase the chances for success of military operations, ten principles
and guidelines ought to be taken into account:
1. Absolute clarity of the military objectives to be achieved (thus avoiding the
creation of false hope).
2. Rules of engagement allowing the use of force whenever required to achieve
the mission of the operation.
3. Unity of command.
4. Generation of sufficient forces for the objectives (which otherwise have to
be adapted in function of the available forces, or deployment cancelled or
postponed).
5. Guaranteeing the security of one’s own forces.
6. The availability of reserves able to cope with any worst-case scenario.
7. Clear assignment of the non-military tasks to other partners present in the-
atre.
8. Clarity of the desired end-state, the ultimate objective (the military objective
being only a means to that end).
9. Support of public opinion at home and of the local population on the
ground.
10. Primus inter pares: a comprehensive political strategy.
Compiling this list is of course easy; fulfilling all of these conditions in real life
is another matter, as we have learned in 2001. Yet the list is useful, as a tool to
analyse what went wrong and how we can do better in the future.
To Conclude
Today crisis management can indeed be put back on the right track. First of all
a revised and credible strategy must be adopted, which clearly defines the objec-
tives, with which the means must be aligned. This strategy must be shared, i.e.
it must not just be based on a passive consensus, but on the active and perma-
nent involvement of all relevant actors as a precondition to generate substantial
contributions of means. These means must not only be “more”, they must above
all be “better”. There is no military solution – but neither is there a political
solution without the military means. These can however only be successfullyEND-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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deployed in the context of a clear political roadmap, which involves all regional
actors, including Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and China.
Finally every country that contributes with civilian and/or military means
should actively participate in the strategic debate. In combination with an active
policy of communication vis-à-vis public opinion, this is a precondition to have
in our own capitals a serene debate about why and how to contribute in this
crisis – the kind of debate that every potential deployment of a country’s military
and civilian forces requires.25
Summary of Recommendations
To the International Community
1. An inclusive dialogue towards shared strategic objectives:
• An inclusive debate must be started, with the active involvement of all
relevant actors, in order to forge a broad consensus about the desired
end-state and a roadmap for crisis management in Afghanistan, Pakistan
and the region, including the means required to achieve a durable solu-
tion.
• The involvement of Iran, India, China and Russia, but also of other coun-
tries from Asia and the Middle East is vital.
• The US and the EU must take the lead in launching this debate.
2. Generation of the required means through cooperation instead of pressure:
• The required military, civilian and financial means to achieve the shared
strategy must be generated through a conference including a follow-up
mechanism.
• The US, the EU and the UN, together with the World Bank, must take the
lead in organizing such a conference.
3. Getting its act together:
• A framework must be created that allows for the guidance of all interna-
tional actors involved on the ground towards a “unity of effort”, effi-
ciency and efficacy, and a single voice when dealing with the local author-
ities.
• The existing Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board must be strength-
ened in order to achieve true partnership with the Afghan government as
well as other Afghan actors, finally to arrive at self-suffiency.
• Donors and NGOs must target their actions in function of the policies
agreed in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board.
• The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General must have a
strong mandate, including not only oversight of the strategic options
taken, but also of actual implementation of projects.
To the United Nations
4. Unity of effort through a strong Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General:
• The Special Representative must be a person with great political author-
ity.END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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• He/she must have a strong mandate allowing to effectively coordinate all
international efforts, including as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board.
• He/she must have adequate staff and a liaison network with all relevant
actors. These staff must be recruited according to flexible procedures
emphasising expertise and continuity.
To NATO
5. Focus on Afghan ownership:
• A renewed strategy should allow NATO to review its own contribution
to the overall international effort.
• The emphasis must be on reinforcing the efforts to create an effective
Afghan National Army, capable of operating independently, and on con-
tinued support to the Afghan National Police.
• Uniformity and coherence in civil-military issues must be reinforced. Pro-
grammes in the context of Provincial Reconstruction Teams must be
aimed at local needs and at their eventual transfer to local communities
or international civilian actors.
• Whenever NATO is called upon by the international community to pro-
vide support in non-military areas, such as reconstruction or Security Sec-
tor Reform, appropriate funding arrangements should be developed.
To the EU
6. Live up to the European Security Strategy:
• The EU must actively contribute to the strategic debate, not only about
the political but about all dimensions of crisis management for Afghani-
stan and the region, in line with the comprehensive approach of the Euro-
pean Security Strategy.
• Special emphasis must be put on forging a global political agreement in a
regional context and on promoting economic cooperation and trade with
Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
• As in Afghanistan NATO is in charge of the military dimension of crisis
management, the EU must focus on the civilian dimension, notably on
support and training of the Afghan National Police and the creation of a
justice system. The contribution of the EU and its Member States must be
in line with their political, economic and demographic weight. The EU
should assess to which extent the means offered by Member States can be
supplemented by EU means.END-STATE AFGHANISTAN
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• The EU must reinforce its capacity to plan and run complex civilian and
military operations, both in Brussels and on the ground.
To Belgium and the other EU Member States
7. A fully-fledged national position:
• Like the other EU Member States, Belgium cannot judge its contribution
to crisis management in Afghanistan from a national perspective only.
Each government must actively participate in the broader international
debate, in the EU, NATO as well as the UN.
• On the basis of the consensus forged in those frameworks should the
national contribution be decided, not only in military terms, but also in
terms of police and justice, and financial means.
• In light of the desired end-state, longer-term policies must be developed
in order to generate the indicated sustained civilian and military contri-
butions and corresponding budgets.
8. Public opinion:
• At each level, but at the national level especially, a communications strat-
egy must be developed to inform the public of the objectives set with
regard to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region and their importance for
one’s own society.
• The exact motivation of all national decisions to contribute or not must
be explained, including the risks of either option.